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GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES ON INTERSTATE
TRANSACTIONS
(AIN'T GOD TOUGH ON INDIANA*)
ALLISON DUNHAM
In recent years the Supieme Court has been reconsidering the effect of
the commerce clause on the power of the state either to regulate or tax interstate commerce. Whatever bases the Court has suggested for the resultsand there have been many-an examination of the cases since 1938 indicates
that, with few exceptions, greater freedom has been allowed the states under
the commerce clause than was heretofore thought possible. Unfortunately
1
for Indiana, the major exceptions appear in 1938 and 1946 in two cases
which deny that State important sources of revenue under its gross income
tax law. Between those two dates only one non-discriminatory transaction
tax has been invalidated.
The late Chief Justice Stone, first as a dissenter, then as a majority
spokesman, evidenced considerable interest in this problem and made major
contributions by use of hi' eminently practical approach 2 to the learning on
the effect of the commerce clause on state tax activities. For some years a
sharp debate has divided members of the Court on the judicial function under
the commerce clause.3 As re-examination of this question has pressed forward, differences in the views of individual justices haye developed and
sharpened. 4
There is nothing requiring adverse comment in the divergence of opinion over the proper approach to judicial review of state taxing activities under
the, commerce clause. However, it is unusual that within a year after Chief
Justice Stone's death the majority of the Supreme Court should not only discard recently developed doctrines but should so quickly return the Court to the
* With apologies to William Herschell and his poem entitled "Ain't God Good to Indiana."
1. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1939), and Freeman v. Hewitt, 67 Sup.
Ct. 274 (1946). McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944), which invalidated an
Arkansas sales tax, appears more properly classifiable as a due process case rather than a
commerce clause case.
2. See Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws (1946) 46 COLUMBIA LAw REv. 719;
Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution (1946) 46 COLUMBIA LAw RFv. 764, 785.
3. See majority and dissenting opinions in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307,
316 (1939) ; Gwinn, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 442 (1939) ; Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U. S.761, 784 (1945) ; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S.416,
435 (1946); cf. Black, J., concurring in Morgan v. Virginia, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 1058

(1946).

4. Compare the views of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, 309 U. S.176, 183 (1940) with his views in McLgod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327
(1944) and Freeman v. Hewitt, 67 Sup. Ct. 274 (1946).
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position it held when he came to the Supreme Court in 1925. Discarding old
doctrine or terminology for new is commonplace; abandoning new for thoroughly criticized old is unusual.
Freemait v. Hewitt, decided December 16, 1946,r involving a gross income tax on an interstate transaction presents such a unique situation. It is.
the first case in the writer's recollection in which the late Chief Justice has
been in effect overruled. 6 The majority dismisses his approach in a brief
reference to "fashions" in judicial writing.
It is not the purpose of this paper to speculate on how Chief Justice
Stone would have voted in the Freeman case, but, in light of doctrines recently developed, to examine the varying approaches to the problem advanced
by the three opinions in the case and to consider the direction in which Stone's
approach was leading the Court prior to this case.
On the facts the Freeman situation is different from any other recent
interstate commerce case. It does not involve a transaction growing out of
ordinary commercial or business activity, nor marketing of manufactured or
processed goods by a manufacturer, processor, or buying and selling agency.
Neither does it deal with receipts from transportation or interstate communication, as did the first gross receipts tax cases. As far as the taxpayer is.
concerned, the interstate transaction taxed here was an isolated sale unrelated
to the taxpayer's ordinary business.
A trustee, domiciled in Indiana, in managing the investment portfolio
of a testamentary trust created and administered under the laws of Indiana,
placed an order to sell certain stocks and bonds at a specified price with his
Indiana broker. Through the New York correspondent of the Indiana broker
the securities were offered for sale on the New York Stock Exchange. When
a purchaser was found, the Indiana broker was notified and in turn informed
the trustee, who delivered the certificates to the broker for transmission to
New York. Upon receipt by the New York correspondent, the certificates
were delivered to the purchaser who paid the purchase price. After deduction of expenses and commissions the proceeds were transmitted to the Indiana broker who delivered the proceeds, less his commission, to the trustee.
Indiana assessed a 1% tax on the amount received by the trustee from this
transaction. The Supreme Court of Indiana sustained the tax in a suit for
7
refund on the ground that the situs of the securities was Indiana.
The case was first argued in November, 1944, but apparently the Court
was unable to reach an agreement and the case was set down for reargument,
5. 67 Sup. Ct. 274 (1946).
6. Cf. Gardner, Mr. Chief Justice Stone (1946) 59 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1209.

7. 221 Ind. 675, 51 N. E.(2d) 6 (1943).
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with direction to counsel to argue the commerce clause question.8 That the
Court directed reargument with attention of counsel so directed may indicate
that the Court desired to re-examine the basic principles of state taxation of
interstate transactions.
Such a re-examination-if not actually required by the cases-was at
least desirable. To all appearances there were conflicting lines of authority
before the court. Those seeking to uphold state taxes turned to American
Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,9 Western Livestock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue'"
and McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co." for support. Those seeking to
strike down such taxes turned to Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen.12
The Adams case was the first test of the Indiana gross income tax to

reach the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Indiana tax could not
constitutionally reach the gross proceeds received by an Indiana manufacturer
from out-of-state sales of his goods. Perhaps this case, without more, could
have been the basis of a reversal of the Indiana Supreme Court here. But
to have so used it would have been to ignore some embarrassing authorities.
Although the Adams case, when compared with the use tax cases' 3 and
the Berwind-White decision, is the basis for the belief among commentators 4
that the state of the seller may not tax proceeds of interstate sales but the
buyer's state may, the Freeman case is the first since Adams to strike down
a tax by a state of origin on the proceeds of an interstate transaction. Some
cases since Adanms have upheld the tax on facts scarcely distinguishable in
the economic effect of the tax on interstate commerce.' 5
In dissenting in Freeman v. Hewitt, Justice Douglas thought that the
Adds situation could be distinguished as involving a serious threat of multiple taxation of interstate commerce. Although in disagreement on this point,
8. 66 Sup. Ct. 19 (1945). The opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court had rested the
validity of the tax on the ground that intangible property was located at the domicile of
the owner. Hewitt v. Freeman, 221 Ind. 675, 51 N. E. (2d) 6 (1943). The Indiana Attorney General had continued this argument in the Supreme Court. On reargument his
brief, while answering the questions posed by the Court, again emphasized the intangible
nature of the property. The majority correctly disposed of this argument summarily. A
tax imposed on the proceeds of a sales transaction of intangible property is no different
from a sales transaction of tangible property.
9. 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
10. 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
11. 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
12. 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
13. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.
v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939) ; Nelson v. Sears Roebuck Co., 312 U. S. 359 (1941);
General Trading Corp. v. Tax Comm., 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
14. See Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate-Commerce (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV.
617; Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade (1940) 53 HARv. L. Rav. 1253;
Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 909; McNamara,
Jurisdictionaland Interstate Commerce Problems in the Imposition of Excises on Sales
(1941) 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 482; Morrison, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
(1942) 36 ILT. L. REv. 727.
15. Discussed infra pp. 224, 225.
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the majority viewed recent cases as sufficiently damaging to the Adams authority to require something more to strike down the tax.
But the something more which justice Frankfurter provided as a basis
for limiting the reach of the Indiana gross income tax, is, if not surprising, at
least disturbing to all state taxing authorities. The Court does not lessen the
disturbance by stating that opinions in this field "must be read in the setting
of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their special
facts." For, as the concurring opinion points out, if the basis of the decision
is to be applied only to dispose of the present case it is an "arbitrary formula"
which is tough only on Indiana.
PRIOR APPROACHES

The majority starts, as it must, with the proposition that the commerce
clause "of its own force" places restrictions on state power to tax or regulate
interstate commerce. 16 But this century-old doctrine, stemming from Cooley
7
-that the commerce clause .prohibits some but not
v. Board of Wardens1
all state regulation or taxation-is only the first hurdle and the one easiest
to take. If there is a negative implication to the commerce clause-that some
state action affecting interstate commerce is not permissible-how can Mr.
Hewitt of the Indiana gross income tax division know or determine which is
valid and which unconstitutional?
The Cooley case said that if the "subjects of this power" are "national,"
"exclusive legislation by Congress" alone is permissible; if "local," the states

may act-at least, until Congress acted contradictorily.
This approach seemed to suggest that in resolving a commerce clause
controversy involving state legislation the Court should focus its attention on
the need for uniformity and should weigh local interests against interference
with national interests. Perhaps because this involved an open policy judgment unobscured by legal terminology, later justices began to speak of the
"subject" of state activity as the controlling factor, without considering the
effect of the state law on interstate commerce. This "subject-measure" approach required a determination of the "incidence" of the tax; i.e., on what
was it imposed? To determine this, the Court began by denying controlling

effect to the language of the statute and then went on to inquire more deeply;
however, it failed to develop a workable standard to guide it in deciding when
a tax was "on" a local rather than an interstate activity. Then new terminology evolved. The Court spoke of "direct" and "indirect" effects or burdens
16. The concurring opinion agrees and the dissent does not deny this negative implication of the commerce clause. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power
(1940) 27 VA. L. Rav. 1, for a general discussion of this question.
17. 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851).
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on interstate commerce-the latter being valid. However, this terminology
was merely a statement of result,' 8 useless in determining which taxes were
valid. Finally, in 1938, Justice Stone attempted to re-state commerce clause
law. For gross income tax cases he advanced the now famous "multiple
burden" theory as an explanation of the cases:
"The vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is that they

have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of
substance, of being imposed... or added to

. .

. with equal right by every state

which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so
that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce.'"
The majority opinion discards this new terminology and the factual approach that went with it. The factual approach, at least in tax cases, is irrelevant, says Justice Frankfurter, a mere "fashion in judicial writing." While
the negative implication doctrine applies to all state policy no matter what
state interest gives rise to its legislation, different points of departure are to
be taken by the Supreme Court, depending on whether the state legislation is
regulatory or revenue-raising.20 If the former, Justice Frankfurter says:
"The incidence of a particular type of State action may throw the balance
in support of the local need because interference with the national interest is
remote or unsubstantial." If a tax statute, the incidence of the tax is controlling. If the tax is a "direct tax u'pon" interstate commerce or a "levy
upon the very process of commerce" or a "direct tax on interstate sales,"
the commerce clause strikes down the tax however remote or insubstantial
the interference with commerce.
Why this distinction between police power and tax cases? Because, say
the majority, "vital local interests" may be involved in regulatory measures,
but everyone knows that a state can get its revenue from other sources if
one particular source is cut off. Denying a state one source of revenue, it is
said, cannot "impose a crippling limitation on a State's ability to carry on its
local function."
But to carve dut of existing sources of state revenue so substantial a
slice as that represented by taxes on interstate sales of securities may be more
crippling than the unsupported edict of Justice Frankfurter would lead us
to believe. Transaction taxes first appeared in volume after 1932 because of
increasing demands upon government and diminishing returns from the usual
18. See Stone, J., dissenting in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 43 (1927).
19. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Int. Rev., 303 U. S.250, 255 (1938).

20. Compare Mr. Justice Stone's suggestion in his dissent in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania,

273 U. S.34, 43 (1927), that "other considerations" may apply with respect to state taxation. What these were he did not develop. The case material does not yield much evidence that this classification has had any bearing on the problem.
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sources of state revenue. In 1940 39.5% of the state tax dollar came from
such taxes.2 ' The reports of the National Tax Association abound with
material on the difficult problems facing state legislatures in raising revenue.2
To dismiss the revenue-raising problem of state governments so cavalierly is
to say, "Let them eat cake."
Even assuming that the alternatives available to a state in its search for
revenue warrant the different treatment accorded to tax cases, does a tax administrator, a taxpayer, a lower court, or even the Supreme Court know any
better now how to determine the validity of a tax than before Freeman v.
Hewitt? The validity of any terminology must be tested by asking: Does
it convey any meaning to those who must use it? Does it show its reason
on its face ?23
DIFFICULTIES WITH JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S

NEW STYLE

Justice Frankfurter's terminology is a new version of old labels. Where
Justice Strong and his contemporaries in the 1870's said that a state tax is
invalid if "on" interstate commerce 24 and Justice Butler and his colleagues in
the 1920's held the tax invalid if it was a "direct burden" on interstate commerce, 25 Justice Frankfurter strikes down a tax if it is "directly on" interstate commerce. This is a return to the old subject-measure approach in not even
slightly disguised form. The great controlling principle of constitutional
law now revolves around the meaning of the preposition "on." 20 "On" must
mean "on" something. To the drafter of legislation a tax is "on" the subject
or object upon which the statute says the tax is imposed. If this meaning
were religiously followed, the users of tax materials would know how to
administer Justice Frankfurter's currently stylish terminology even though
the terminology would not reveal the reas6n for its use. The judicial function would become nothing more than advice on legislative drafting.
21. BURAUU
(1940) 2.

OF THE CENSUS,

10 STATE AND LOCAL GOVRNMENT SPECIAL STUDY

22. See, e.g., 30 PROC. NAT. TAX. Ass'N (1937). For a general collection of materials,
see the symposium on consumption taxes in (1941) 8 LAW & CoNTmP. PROD. 415, especially at 430 et seq.
,23. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautliful in Law (1942) 9 U. OF Cni. L.
REv. 224, 250: "Only the rule which shows its reason on its face has ground to claim
maximum chance of continuing effectiveness. .. "
24. Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 272 (U. S. 1872) ; Philadelphia & So.
S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 341 (1887).
25. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 37 (1927) overruled by California v.
Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 (1941); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S.
338, 346 (1929).
26. Cf. Cardozo, J., dissenting in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 327
(1936) : "But a great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive
statement in an adjective."
27. Cf. Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Action
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 773, 774: "[T]he states can tax interstate commerce if they
go about it in the right way."
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We are told, for example, that the seller state is not frozen out of lucrative revenues by this decision because the state can levy a tax "on" the privilege of manufacturing or of residence. It can measure the tax by net income from interstate sales, and even by the gross income of a manufacturing
plant if the formula of American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis is used.
It should follow, therefore, that the mysteries of the commerce clause
would disappear with changes in the wording of tax statutes from a tax
"upon gross income" or "upon the proceeds of any sale" to a tax "upon the
privilege" of manufacturing, residence, severance or some other activity,
even though calculated at the same rate on the same gross income from the
same transactions as before. If Justice Frankfurter means this, Indiana
could tax the gross receipts of the Adams Manufacturing Co. by slight
changes in the wording of the challenged act.
But when this terminology was in vogue before, the situation was not so
simple. The process of determining when a tax is "on" interstate sales or
"on" the very process of commerce and not "on" something else bedeviled the
Court when it used this terminology seventy years ago and it bedevils Justice
Frankfurter today. For example, we are told that U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak
Creek28 involved a tax on "the privilege of residence" measured by net income
derived from interstate transactions and that such a tax is valid but that in
the Freeman case it is bad because it is "on" the very sale in interstate commerce. This difference cannot be discerned from the statutory language. In
the Oak Creek case the Wisconsin statute provided that a tax was to be
"assessed, levied and collected upon all income . . . received by every person
residing within the statd. . ." The Indiana tax is "imposed .'. . upoti
the receipt of gross income . . . of all persons resident and/or domiciled in
'
Neither can the distinction be found in different character. . . Indiana."2
izations by the state courts, for the Indiana Supreme Court has called the tax
a levy "on the privilege" of domicile.30
There are other difficulties with this terminology. It is said that the
Freeman case involved a tax which was a "direct imposition" on interstate
sales but that the same tax in InternationalHarvester v. Dep't o Treasury9'
was "a tax on the transfer of property within the state." Hence a tax "on"
a sale is not "on" the transfer of property and vice versa, even though the
transfer of property occurs as a result of a sale!
If Justice Frankfurter does not attach the same meaning to "on" as
the state legislator, what does he mean? An economist might insist that a
28. 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
29. IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1943) § 64-2602.
30. Miles v. Dep't of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372 (1935).
31. 322 U. S. 340 (1944).
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tax "on" gross income is a tax on interstate commerce, but he would also say
that a tax on net income is a tax on interstate commerce or that a tax on the
privilege of manufacture is on the proceeds of the interstate sales of manufactured goods. But the economist's definition cannot be used because Justice
Frankfurter declares that the economic burden -of the tax is irrelevant in
determining its validity. Nor does the fact that the Court cites with approval
cases sustaining taxes on the privilege of manufacture measured by gross
income resolve the problem.
One other possible meaning is suggested by Justice Frankfurter's distinction of the InternationalHarvestercase and by his opinion in McLeod v. Dilworth.8 2 A tax is "on" an interstate sale when the property interest in the
goods passes without the state but not if the property interest passes within.
This introduces "title-passing" questions of sales law into the commerce clause 8
and satisfies neither requirement for good terminology-it neither helps its
users s4 nor conveys its reason.
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE HESITANTLY CONCURS

The concurring opinion sharply attacks this terminology and asks how a
tax "on" net income from interstate transactions is any less "direct" or any
less "on" interstate commerce, or how the free flow of commerce is any less
deterred by a tax on the privilege of manufacturing goods for commerce
when measured by the gross income from that commerce. We are left to
guess the answers to these questions. The majority does give one explanation.
In making a statesman-like decision accommodating both state and national
interest the Court will allow the state to divide up a business and give the
manufacturing part "detached relevance for the purpose of local taxation."
Why manufacturing is entitled to "'detached relevance" more than domicile or
other incidents in this case is ignored by the majority, apparently because the
tax is not "on" those incidents but "on" gross ineome from interstate sales8 5
Having attacked the grounds of the majority opinion, Justice Rutledge is
left to explain (1) why he concurred and (2) what principles he would use to
tell Mr. Hewitt when he can tax income from interstate commerce and when
not.
Justice Rutledge explains that he concurs because it is necessary to prevent "the cumulative and therefore discriminatory tax burden which would
vest on or seriously threaten interstate commerce if more than one state'is al32. 322 U. S. 327 (1944).

33. Cf. Holmes, J., in Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512 (1906): "'Commerce among the several States' is a practical conception not drawn from the 'witty diver-

sities' (Yelv., 33) of the law of sales."
34. Cf. LLEwELLYN. CASES AND MATEIALS

ON SALES

(1930) 561 et seq.

35. But see Miles v. Dep't of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 186, 199 N. E. 372, 378 (1935).
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lowed to impose the tax, as does Indiana, upon the gross receipts from the
sale without apportionment or credit for taxes validly imposed elsewhere."
His principle causes him difficulty. He states that the Adams case is not
a proper solution because it went too far in discriminating in favor of interstate commerce in so far as it forbids both states to tax. He recognizes the
logical and practical difficulty of allowing one but not both states to tax when
both may have "equal or substantial due process connections with the transaction." He therefore rejects the buyer-seller state distinction as a solution.
He further concludes that a solution by factual determination in particular
cases of the actual or probable incidence of both taxes is open to objection
because it fills the Court with litigation.
As a judge, he is forced to decide, even if among evils and even if there
is no ideal solution. A Solomon-like practical decision is hesitantly made: the
state of the market should have full power to tax "subject to power in the f orwarding state also to tax by allowing credit to the full amount of any tax paid
or due at the destination." This, he says, would relieve the Court of volumes
of litigation.
The proposal for a credit of tax paid in the state of market rather than
apportionment of income among the interested states is the new item which
Justice Rutledge introduces into the literature on this subject. Adams and
subsequent cases talked of apportionment of income. The idea of a "credit"
is admittedly not founded on any constitutional principle; it is a "legislative"
conclusion.ao
At several places in his opinion, however, Justice Rutledge speaks of
"credit" and "apportionment" in the same breath, as if synonymous. At other
times he refers to apportionment as an allocation of income among the interested states. It is in this latter sense that the word was used in the Adams
case. Perhaps this commingling and confusion of terms is deliberate, because,
as he indicates, the Berwind-White case makes even an apportioned tax in the
seller state produce a double tax burden. It is apparent Justice Rutledge
would like to approve the principle of apportionment of income as a way out
of the muddle but he is worried that Berwind-White stands in his way. Thus
he proposes a new alternative-the credit device-and reserves judgment
whether an apportioned tax by the seller state can be sustained if the buyer
state also imposes a tax.
36. Whether this "credit" is of any value to any state revenue department remains to

be seen. While there may be more, 461 C. C. H. 1946 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 181.815 lists 23
states that have general sales, occupational or gross income taxes. Three of these are at
3%, one at 2Y2%, sixteen at 2% and three at 1%. All of these 23 states could collect taxes
from sales to the other 25 states. But among themselves only the 3% states would get any
substantial advantage from the credit system. This might well produce a race for nonstandard rates such as 2.8% or 3.4% in order to get at least some tax, after credit for the
buyer state tax.
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International Harvester Co. v. Evatt,37 decided Jan. 6, 1947, apparently
answers Justice Rutledge's reservation. There Ohio imposed a tax on "the
privilege of doing business." The tax was computed in part by apportioning
the value of the business done according to a fraction representing in the
numerator, sales of goods manufactured in the Ohio plants no matter where
sold or delivered, and in the denominator, the value of the country-wide business. Goods manufactured in Ohio but sold by out-of-state branches to outof-state customers with direct deliveries from the Ohio plant constituted 39%
of the business of the Ohio plant. Where the Indiana branch of International
Harvester sold to an Indiana customer with delivery direct to the Indiana
customer from the Ohio plant, the sales were taxable in Indiana under InternationalHarvesterv. Department of Treasury.38 Thus the problem worrying
Justice Rutledge was present. The state of the buyer imposed its tax and the
same sale was included f9r apportionment in calculating the tax in the seller
state. To some extent, at least, there was a multiple tax burden. The Court
unanimously upheld the tax under both the commerce clause and the 14th
Amendment.

A

RECONCILIATION OF STATE

GRoss

RECEIPTS TAX CASES

Since the "multiple burden" theory of striking down a gross receipts tax
unless apportioned has been so widely discussed, an examination of the cases
since Western Livestock, particularly the opinions of Chief Justice Stone, may
shed some light on the application of this principle.
In the Western Livestock case, the late Chief Justice attempted to derive
from the past cases principles underlying the ever-changing judicial terminology or "styles", if you will. Two principles were thought evident: (1) that
interstate commerce should pay its way; i.e., that the commerce clause should
not be interpreted to discriminate in favor of interstate commerce; (2) that
when state transaction taxes have been struck down it was because they did or
could result in a multiple tax burden on the interstate transaction which did
not exist as to the intrastate transaction.
As Chief Justice Stone was first to recognize, when either one of these
principles is used as ratio decidendi in deciding new cases rather than as an
explanation of old cases, a conflict between these principles may well develop.
If the danger of a multiple tax burden is so emphasized that state taxation of
an interstate transaction is prohibited at any stage of the transaction, then
interstate commerce may be placed at a competitive advantage over other commerce. If the principle that commerce must pay its way is applied to uphold
all taxes non-discriminatory on their face, a competitive disadvantage to inter37. 67 Sup. Ct. 444 (1947).
38. 322 U. S. 340 (1944).
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state commerce might result in some situations.

Stone recognized that the

conflict could be reconciled neither by resort to a syllogism nor by resort to
labels. "Practical rather than logical distinctions must be sought."
In the Western Livestock case, the preparation, binding and publication
of the advertising matter and receipt of the sums paid for it all occurred in
New Mexico. Nothing occurred in any other state on which that state could
lay its hands for taxes; therefore no multiple tax burden could result. There
was no possibility of conflict between the two principles. New Mexico had a
substantial relationship to the taxpayer and the performance of the transaction
taxed. Making a practical judgment, the Court could not say it was unreasonable to permit New Mexico to tax the receipts on the interstate transaction'
arising from the sale of advertising space. As Stone had pointed out in South
Carolin
r State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bras.39 earlier in the same term,
state activity is invalidated only when there is an "unreasonable interference
with national interest." The number of local activities involved in the performance of the interstate transaction is the basis for the Court's practical
judgment as to the reasonableness of the burden on interstate commerce. It
is not to prove that the tax'is "on" those incidents rather than "on" the interstate elements of the transaction.
Chief Justice Stone referred to situations where gross receipts taxes had
been struck down and those where they had been sustained "when fairly apportioned to commerce carried on within the taxing state." He also referred
with approvalto cases such as Ficklen v. Shelby Count34 0 and American Mfg.
4
Co. v. St. LouisY
where the tax was sustained as a fair means of measuring
a local privilege or franchise even though it was imposed upon the entire gross
receipts of the taxpayer derived from the exercise of the franchise, including
those arising from interstate transactions. Western Livestock Co. v. Bureau
of Internal Reventue recognized, therefore, that there were some situations
where an unapportioned gross receipts tax would be sustained and some where
apportionment was necessary. In the former the multiple burden which might
result was not an unreasonable interference with national interests; in the
latter it was.
It is doubtful that Stone had clearly determined at this time where he was
going with the multiple burden test. Further developments would determine
the applicability of the multiple burden theory. As he clearly indicated, the
reconciliation of the two principles of the Western Livestock case required
practical policy judgments, and believing that this was a proper function of the
judiciary, Stone was not averse to making them.
39. 303 U. S. 177 (1938).
40. 145 U. S. 1 (1892).
41. 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
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Except for Adams, in which Stone joined and which he later explained,
the only case in which the multiple burden theory has been used to strike down
a gross income tax without apportionment is Gwinn, White & Princev. Henneford.4 2 The facts of this case may indicate at least one of the situations in
which Stone regarded apportionment as a controlling element. The taxpayer
was a marketing agent for fruit growers in Washington. As to some transactions, the taxpayer received the fruit from the seller and forwarded it to outof-state buyers from which it had solicited business. But more often the fruit
was shipped from the Washington sellers to the taxpayer's branches at out-ofstate points where it was then diverted to buyers. These branch offices negotiated the sale of the fruit, made delivery and collected the purchase price.
The opinion emphasizes the fact that the taxpayer was performing service in
the aid of interstate communication and transportation and it also emphasizes
the substantial out-of-state activities performed by the branch houses.
Prior to Western Livestock, the gross receipts taxes which had been
denied application to interstate transactions without apportionment were taxes
on transactions of a telephone company,4 3 a railroad company, 44 a steamship4
stevedoring company, 45 a wholesaler-exporter, 40 and a radio station -all of
which obtained their revenues from servicing or actually carrying on the processes of interstate commerce. By the very nature of the activities involved
most of them were businesses having far-flung and multi-state relations with
respect to each transaction. Thus the receipts from an interstate telephone
communication can hardly be fairly attributed in full to the state of the caller,
the state through which the message is sent or the state of the recipient. The
receipts are attributable to use of property and to substantial activities of persons in many states. Each state has substantial connections with the transaction, yet to allow each to tax in full is to impose a multiple burden on the processes of interstate commerce to its potential disadvantage. And since the disadvantage might be in the processes of commerce, it would be reflected
throughout the entire economy. Gwinn, White & Prime v. Henneford is
consistent on its facts with these cases, since it requires apportionment by the
distributing state of the gross receipts of a commercial broker among the
states in which substantial activities, property and branch offices were located.
The Adams opinion, written by Justice Roberts, in which Chief Justice
Stone joined, does seem to apply the same principle to taxes on gross receipts
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from interstate sales of a manufacturer having his plant in one state and only
an extra-state sales force to facilitate performance of the interstate movement
of goods, but no far-flung business activities such as those involved in International Harvesterv. Evatt.
At this point, therefore, Stone's views on the unapportioned gross income
tax were reflected as follows: (1) He had cited with approval the preWestern Livestock cases invalidating unapportioned gross income taxes when
applied to the processes of interstate commerce, such as transportation services; (2).he had written an opinion invalidating an unapportioned gross receipts tax in a distributing state on receipts derived from activities in far-flung
operations which had substantial connections, including branch houses, in
many states, and an activity that serviced interstate transactions in the manner
of transportation companies; (3) he had cited with approval cases upholding
unapportioned gross income taxes where the total gross income -was considered
a fair measure of the state's exaction for activities within a state of a business
that did not have substantial out-of-state connections; yet (4) he had joined
in an opinion which seemed to require the application of the apportionment
doctrine to all transactions in interstate commerce when a gross receipts tax
was sought to be imposed. Three and four seem to represent inconsistent
positions, but "Berwind-White sets Adams in its proper perspective and permits reconciliation of these positions.
The Berwind-White and related cases recognized that the multiple burden
theory could be carried so far as to obliterate the other principle of Western
Livestock-that interstate commerce is not to be given a free ride. Where the
tax was imposed on a transaction or receipts of the transaction by the state of
market and paid by citizens of that state the Court could look to numerous
decisions upholding such a tax in similar situations, and by emphasizing the
equality of treatment of all transactions performed in the state, could say that
it was not an unreasonable interference with national interests for the state of
market to impose a tax on receipts from the interstate transactions-unless the
multiple burden test of Adams required a different result.
Of course a multiple burden results in any case only if the Court allows
it. To fear a multiple burden in Adanms is to imply that, the state of market
can tax. But perhaps Adams was a mistaken or misunderstood application of
the doctrine.
In distinguishing Adams, the Bermind-White decision seemed to suggest
limitations upon it, pointing out that in Adams the Court had "found" that
receipts "from activities in interstate commerce . . . were incltded in the

measure of the tax, the sales price, without segregation or apportionment."
This is not the same as saying "receipts from interstate transactions," but it
suggests that at least part of the sales price in Adams represented value at-
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tributable to interstate activities distinct from interstate sale such as transportation costs or marketing costs attributable to branch houses in many
states; and that had the Court found otherwise, a different result might have
followed. But it also emphasized that had this part of the sales price been
segregated or a part of the sales price apportioned to the interstate activity, the
tax would have been sustained. Manufacturing, like marketing, gives the
state substantial connections with the transaction and makes it difficult for the
Court to conclude that it is unreasonable for the seller state to tax.
The cases subsequent to Berwind-White indicate that there is nothing in
48
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the catch-phrase that the seller state cannot tax without apportionment.
4
appears in Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Co. " that it was not unreasonable to attribute the entire proceeds of interstate transactions to the seller
state where the proceeds arose from the sale of railroad ties produced in
Indiana but sold to an out-of-state railroad by a non-resident seller which received the proceeds at its out-of-state office. But the proceeds attributed to
Indiana included only the charges for untreated ties. Indiana did not attempt
to tax charges for the creosoting treatment given to all ties at the seller's outof-state creosoting plant. Only as explained in Berwind-White is Adams consistent with-the result in this case, unless the commerce clause is to turn on the
"witty diversities" of sales law.
This case was followed by Dep't of Treasuryv. Ingram-RichardsonMfg.
Co. 0 in which Indiana was permitted to tax the proceeds from the process of
enameling products of out-of-state manufacturers brought into the state for
processing on orders solicited out-of-state and returned to the out-of-state
manufacturer. The taxpayer did not claim properly that Indiana could not
tax that part of the proceeds attributable to the transportation of the products
from and to the customers' plants in other States. Only if that issue had been
before the Court would the Adams case, as explained in the Berwhid-Wzite
case, have been involved. Otherwise, even though interstate commerce was
essential to the performance of the enameling process, it was not unreasonable
to attribute the entire proceeds to Indiana for tax purposes because substantial
activities occurred there and nowhere else.
InternationalHarvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury' even upheld the Indiana tax as applied to out-of-state sales of goods manufactured in Indiana
where the only difference on the facts from Adams was that because the articles were trucks, the buyer could and did go to Indiana to drive his purchase
home. If Adams is treated as explained in Berwind-White, this case may not
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be inconsistent with the Adams case. Thus, it is not unreasonable to attribute
the entire proceeds of a transaction to the state of manufacture for tax purposes even though the proceeds are again taxable in the state of market.
Finally, a per curiarn opinion in 194152 sustained the Mississippi privilege
tax measured by gross income as applied to the receipts of a taxpayer who
manufactured the goods in Mississippi, accepted the orders solicited by his
out-of-state sales force, and shipped the goods, most. of which went to New
York, where they would be subject to sales tax under the Berwind-White case!
Of course the correct "ritual" was used in Mississippi-it was a tax on the
privilege of manufacture measured by gross income. The Court cited two
cases in support of its conclusion: American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis and Dep't
of Treasury v. Ingrw-Richardson Mfg. Co. The latter involved the Indiana
gross income tax, which both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Roberts have
said, although they joined the per curiam opinion, did not constitute a "privilege" tax but one "on" gross income from interstate sales.
The explanation of Adams given in Berwin4-White, together with the'
subsequent cases, puts the multiple burden theory in its proper perspective:
The danger of a multiple burden on interstate transactions requires the Court
to scrutinize carefully the operation of any transactions tax. It never required
a tax in the buyer state to be struck down because unapportioned; it did require an unapportioned gross receipts tax to be struck down (1) in the distributing state when the receipts included not only that part of the price attributable to the activities of the distributor in the taxing state but also a part clearly
attributable to activities more substantial than selling in other states; (2) in a
producing state where it was found that the tax was imposed on a price which
included sums attributable to the processes of interstate commerce or other
substantial extra-state activity; (3) in any state where the tax was imposed
on transportation or communication companies or other processes of national
commerce. Otherwise apportionment was not necessary and any multiple
burden that resulted was no more than an added cost of doing business in the
same sense as a property tax on the instruments employed in commerce.
The multiple burden theory is, therefore, to be used only to strike down
unapportioned gross receipts taxes on business engaged in the process of interstate commerce on a national scale. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt
involved activities other than transportation, which require gr 6 ss receipts taxes
to be apportioned.
CONCLUSION

That the cases since Adams v. Storen support the proposition that the
multiple burden theory has had only the restricted force indicated is not to say
52. Aponaug Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 190 Miss. 805, 1 So.(2d) 763 (1941), aff'd per
curiam, 314 U. S. 577 (1941).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
that such restriction is proper. The justification for confining the multiple
burden theory stems rather from the need for an "appraisal and accomodation
of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved." Unless the activity burdened is of a "national character," the fiscal interest of the
states should be a weighty enough factor to dissuade the Court from finding
an unreasonable interference with national commerce. Where such an approach would result in sustaining state taxes, it is far from clear that double
taxation will automatically follow.
Justice Rutledge correctly concluded that in at least some situations involving taxation of gross receipts from interstate transactions apportionment
is the teaching of the recent cases. He rightly saw that no aid in identifying
these situations is given by recourse to the slippery words "direct tax on interstate commerce," which the majority unearthed in Freeman v. Hewitt. If the
quoted language meant merely to indicate one of the phrases forbidden to
state tax draftsmen, it reduces constitutional principle to a formulary riddle;
if advanced as a sincere attempt at judicial statement of the constitutional
principle, it merely reinstates an ancient stumbling block and forsakes both
goals of good terminology: utility anrd clear purpose.
Unfortunately, Justice Rutledge's suggested credit offset is scarcely more
'helpful as a statement of constitutional principle. A seller state would have
the alternatives of adjusting its gross receipts taxes to credit those of numerous sister states, or of attempting to avoid the need for a credit by moving the
point of tax incidence to an earlier stage of the production-distribution process. The latter alternative, which would certainly have greater appeal, would
again leave the courts with no guiding principle to answer the recurring question of the constitutionality of each legislative attempt.
An unapportioned gross receipts tax was sustainable on the facts of Freeman v. Hewitt, even though New York could and did tax, because of : (1) the
substantial local incidence of the transaction in Indiana (domicile of the trustee) ; (2) the fact that this is an isolated sale-not in the ordinary course of
the taxpayer's commercial activity; and (3) the elimination, before taxation,
of that part of the receipts attributable to the processes facilitating the interstate sale.
The continuing search by states for needed revenues from taxes upon
transactions with multi-state contacts necessitates clear guide-posts in this
constitutional field. It is unfortunate that a case which had such extended and
serious consideration did not produce the needed guidance. The Supreme
Court will doubtless have an early opportunity to re-examine its conclusions
in Freemanv. Hewitt, and it is to be hoped that reconsideration may result in
a more useful formulation of the Court's views.

